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The Economic Possibilities of
Comparable Worth
James D. Holzhauert
Professors Fischel and Lazear have set themselves about a
most difficult task. For the sake of their argument they concede
that job segregation and the disparity between wages in male- and
female-dominated occupations is due to discrimination against
women. They acknowledge that this discrimination may take the
form of barriers to the entry of women into certain occupations, or
may consist of broad, societal sexism which channels women into
occupations they might not otherwise pursue. And they con-
cede-as history requires-that the market alone cannot be
counted upon to eradicate discrimination. Yet they claim to
demonstrate that the remedy known as comparable worth or pay
equity is not appropriate under any circumstances and will leave
women worse off than they were without the remedy.1
As Professor Becker demonstrates, ' the Fischel and Lazear
thesis is vulnerable on a variety of grounds. I examine their eco-
nomic analysis and find it incomplete and unconvincing. Fischel
and Lazear make two basic economic arguments against compara-
ble worth:
1. Raising wages in female-dominated occupations to the level
of wages in comparable, male-dominated occupations fails to real-
locate jobs between men and women or restore wages to the levels
which would exist without discrimination; and
2. Increasing wages in female-dominated occupations will re-
duce employment in those occupations, resulting in a loss of jobs
for women, making them worse off than they are now.
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. As to the first argu-
ment, I do not know of any advocate of comparable worth who
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claims that the remedy will result in a perfect reallocation of wages
and jobs. It may cause an improvement over the present misalloca-
tion, however, and by merely showing that its results may be im-
perfect, Fischel and Lazear fail to address the critical question:
whether comparable worth would bring about wage levels and job
allocations preferable to those found at present. As to their second
argument, at least three economic counterarguments can be made.
First, demonstrating that comparable worth might deprive some
women of jobs in female-dominated industries does not prove that
the cost of comparable worth to women as a group exceeds its ben-
efit. Second, depending on the nature of the labor market involved,
comparable worth may not result in any loss of jobs. Third, even if
we assume that women will lose jobs and that the initial cost to
women will exceed the initial benefit, over the long haul compara-
ble worth may have precisely the effect its advocates seek.'
I. THE REALLOCATIVE EFFECT OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Fischel and Lazear correctly point out that discrimination low-
ers the wages of women in female-dominated occupations (by their
model,4 from WF* to WE) and increases the wages of men in com-
parable male-dominated occupations (from WM* to WM). Compa-
rable worth, as they indicate, will initially raise wages in the
female-dominated occupations to the level of male wages in com-
parable occupations (WM), rather than to the predicted discrimi-
I My purpose is not to make an affirmative case for comparable worth. It is instead to
question Fischer and Lazear's assertion that comparable worth can be proven to be an inap-
propriate measure by what they assume to be neutral and self-evident economic principles. I
do not criticize Fischel and Lazear's application of the neoclassical economic model to the
labor market. Rather I show that even if we assume that model applies, their analysis does
not prove their point.
By failing to criticize the application of the neoclassical model to the labor market, I do
not endorse it; rather, I share the doubt many economists have about the nature of the labor
market. See, e.g., P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER
ANALYSIS (1970); LESTER THUROw, DANGEROUS CURRENTS 173-215 (1984); LESTER THUROW,
GENERATING INEQUALITY (1975); WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL
VALUE 44-68 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981); Blau & Jusenius, Economists' Ap-
proaches to Sex Segregation in the Labor Market: An Appraisal, in WOMEN AND THE
WORKPLACE 181 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan eds. 1976); Cain, The Challenge of Segmented
Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1215 (1976),
and sources cited therein; Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LABOR MOBILITY
AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 92 (E. Bakke ed. 1954); Marshall & Paulin, The Employment
and Earnings of Women: The Comparable Worth Debate, in I U.S. COMM'N ON CrvIL
RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 196 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ISSUE FOR
THE 80's]. Of course if the labor market does not fit the neoclassical model, Fischel and
Lazear's analysis is inapplicable.
4 See Fischel & Lazear, supra note 1, at 902-03.
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nation-free wage in the female-dominated occupations (WF*)
which, under their model, would be the correct result. The
strength of this argument depends on the relationship between
WM, WF* and W. If WM (the wage in comparable male-
dominated occupations) is substantially closer to WF* (the "natu-
ral wage" in the female-dominated occupations) than WF (the pre-
sent female wage) is, then increasing the wage level from WF to
WM more closely approximates the "correct" result than leaving
wages at WF. One need not determine, however, whether WM is
closer to WF* than WF is in order to rebut Fischel and Lazear's
argument. It is enough to point out that, without knowing more
about the relationship between WM, WF*, and WF, one cannot
say whether the comparable worth remedy will achieve a result
closer to or further from the desired outcome than does the status
quo.
The argument that comparable worth, by raising wages in
female-dominated occupations from WF to WM, will cause a mis-
allocation of labor is equally unpersuasive. It is true that if we as-
sume a competitive labor market, increasing wages from WF to
WM will reduce employment in the female-dominated occupations.
But under this model, discrimination has already artificially in-:
flated employment in the female-dominated occupations. Fischel
and Lazear's Figure 1 indicates that the proper level of employ-
ment is F*, but that as result of discrimination, employment
stands at the higher level of F. So, whether the comparable worth
remedy results in a "better" or "worse" allocation of labor depends
on the relationship between F, F*, and the level of employment
after the imposition of the comparable worth remedy. If the level
of employment after the comparable worth remedy is imposed is
closer to the "natural" level of employment (F*) than the present
level of employment (F) is, the reduction of employment may leave
us "better off" than we are now.
It is not necessary to speculate what the "correct" or "natural"
level of employment in any occupation might be in order to
demonstrate that it is not at all clear-as Fischel and Lazear
claim-that comparable worth will not bring us closer than we are
now to the outcome an economist might deem desirable.' More-
'Id.
Fischel and Lazear also argue that imposition of a comparable worth remedy some-
how "punishes" the "innocent" employers. Assuming that the remedy is applied prospec-
tively, if comparable worth brings about a result closer to that which would be found in a
discrimination-free, competitive market, how is it punitive?
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over, there can be little doubt that the partial success of Title VII
in eradicating discrimination has been achieved at some considera-
ble cost and that significant additional costs would be incurred if
alternative methods of combating discrimination (such as strength-
ening Title VII or enhancing its enforcement) were employed.
Before we can reject comparable worth out of hand, we must com-
pare the results it is likely to achieve and the costs it is likely to
impose with the results and costs of those alternative methods.'
II. THE NATURE OF THE LABOR MARKET AND THE EFFECT OF
COMPARABLE WORTH ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
Fischel and Lazear analogize the comparable worth remedy to
the imposition of a minimum wage in a competitive labor market.
They argue that comparable worth will reduce the employment of
women in female-dominated jobs much like minimum wage laws
reduce employment of unskilled laborers. Their analysis is incom-
plete and, depending on the nature of the labor market involved,
may have led them to an incorrect conclusion.
The argument that comparable worth will hurt women be-
cause it will reduce employment of women in female-dominated
occupations suffers from an analytical flaw quite common to eco-
nomic critiques of law: identifying the probable direction of an ef-
fect without considering its magnitude. In order to determine the
effect of comparable worth on the employment of women (or, for
that matter, on employment in general), it is necessary to consider
the nature of the market for labor upon which comparable worth
might be imposed.
Accepting Fischel and Lazear's competitive model of the labor
market for now, the statement that comparable worth will result in
the loss of some jobs means very little unless we know how many
By conceding for the sake of argument that the wage disparity between men and
women is caused by discrimination in the form of barriers to entry, Fischel and Lazear must
also concede that the prohibition of barriers to entry which has been in effect for over
twenty years has not been completely effective. Because efforts to eradicate barriers to entry
alone have failed to correct the disparity, it is contradictory to concede on the one hand that
sex discrimination causes the disparity between male and female wages, and to argue on the
other hand that all that is needed is to prohibit barriers to entry. Clearly something more is
needed (under Fischel and Lazear's assumptions) to eliminate these barriers and that some-
thing more may have significant costs and imperfect results.
Fischel and Lazear imply that comparable worth does nothing to eradicate barriers to
entry. As I will point out, see infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text, this may be incor-
rect as a matter of economics; comparable worth may indeed contribute to the breakdown of
entry barriers. Moreover, advocates of comparable worth see it as a supplement, not an
alternative, to existing Title VII and Equal Pay Act remedies.
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jobs might be lost, and what countervailing benefits might be
achieved. How many jobs are lost will depend on the elasticity of
the demand for labor. Figure 1 illustrates the model of the
competitive female labor market relied upon by Fischel and
Lazear. Before the imposition of comparable worth, wages are at
WF, and employment is at EF. Comparable worth raises wages to
WF* and reduces employment to EF*. The two panels of Figure 1
FIGURE 1
Wages Wages
rF -- L ------ SL
a I
-II 4
* EI I! Ii
I a "DL: D
! a
EF* EF EF* EF
Employment Employment
(A) (B)
illustrate different elasticities of demand for labor. In panel A, the
demand for labor is relatively elastic, and the loss of jobs caused
by the increase in wages from WF to WF* is relatively large; in
panel B, demand for labor is relatively inelastic, so relatively few
jobs are lost as a result of the increase in wages. Before we can
evaluate whether the benefits of comparable worth under this
model exceed the costs, we must know something about the elastic-
ities of demand for labor." If women would lose relatively few jobs,
but would gain a substantial increase in wages, the gain in wages
' There have been many attempts to measure the elasticity of demand for labor, with
varying results. It does seem likely that the demand for labor is generally inelastic, but
demand curves vary considerably by industry and occupation. Such variations support my
view that we need to know more about the elasticity of demand for labor in any industry or
occupation to which comparable worth may be applied before we can determine whether the
remedy will benefit women. See R. FLANAGAN, R. SMITH & R. EHRENBERG, LABOR ECONOMICS
AND LABOR RELATIONS 91-93 (1984), and sources cited therein.
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may outweigh the cost in job loss.9
More important, the competitive model of the labor market
used by Fischel and Lazear may be inappropriate for many of the
situations in which comparable worth might be applied. The most
important early initiatives in the comparable worth area have in-
volved clerical workers, employees of large corporations, and public
employees (most particularly nurses and teachers). There is reason
to consider the possibility that these workers are employed, for the
most part, by monopsonistic wage-setting employers, not by the
hapless wage-takers Fischel and Lazear assume."0 If the minimum
wage analogy is to be followed, then, it should be considered in the
context of a monopsonistic labor market. The model of such a mar-
ket may lead to conclusions different from those arising from the
competitive model.
In theory, a single employer in a competitive labor market
cannot affect the wage rate in that market; it must pay the going
wage. Such an employer determines whether to employ additional
9 Granted, this looks only at the issue of whether comparable worth will help or hurt
working women, which is the issue raised by Fischel and Lazear. The slightly different issue
of whether comparable worth will bring women closer to the position they would be in with-
out discrimination, and whether it will do so at a lower cost than other remedies, is one that
requires additional research. But saying that additional research is required is the same as
saying that Fischel and Lazear are wrong in asserting that the remedy can be dismissed out
of hand.
10 1 am not merely arguing that there may be occasional employers or industries for
which the competitive model may not apply, and that comparable worth may be appropriate
in those unusual cases. There is reason to believe (both intuitively and from empirical evi-
dence) that monopsony may be widespread in the industries in which many of the most
important female-dominated occupations are found, and may be a common characteristic of
the internal labor markets of large organizations. See, e.g., P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra
note 3, at 92; Devine, Manpower Shortages in Local Government Employment, 59 AM.
ECON. REv. (proceedings) 538, 542 (1969); Ehrenberg & Goldstein, A Model of Public Sector
Wage Determination, 2 J. URB. ECON. 223 (1975); Grune, Pay Equity Is a Necessary Rem-
edy for Wage Discrimination, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 3, at 168-69; Hurd, Equilib-
rium Vacancies in a Labor Market Dominated by Non-Profit Firms: The "Shortage" of
Nurses, 55 Rav. EcoN. & STATISTICS 234 (1973); Kerr, supra note 3, at 92; Link & Landon,
Monopoly and Union Power in the Market for Nurses, 41 S. ECON. J. 649 (1975).
See also American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986), where
Judge Posner acknowledges that the argument that wages are not determined as assumed
by the neoclassical competitive market model "has particular force when applied to a public
employer such as the State of Illinois, which does not have the same incentives that a pri-
vate firm would have to use labor efficiently."
In their rejoinder, Fischel and Lazear assert that industries that have monopsony power
as to female-dominated occupations will also have it as to male-dominated occupations.
This is not true. For example, hospitals and public schools hire maintenance engineers as
well as nursea.and teachers. Obviously they might have much greater market power as to the




workers at this exogenous wage rate by comparing the additional
revenue which can be produced by adding an employee with the
wage to be paid to that employee. The employer will continue to
hire workers up to that point at which the next new employee will
not pay for himself or herself.11
A wage-setting or monopsonistic employer faces a different sit-
uation. By definition, such an employer sets or at least affects the
wage rate it must pay to attract employees. The more workers it
wants to hire, the higher the wage it must offer to all such workers.
For example, if such an employer wants to hire 24 workers it might
have to pay them $12.00 per hour; if it wants to hire 25 workers, it
would have to pay more, say $12.15 per hour. Because it will have
to pay all of its workers the same wage, the extra cost of the addi-
tional worker will not be merely 15 cents per hour, but will instead
be 25 times 15 cents per hour. The marginal cost of hiring the ad-
ditional employee will be $15.75 per hour, consisting of the addi-
n This is illustrated by Figure 2; MRL charts the marginal revenue of labor (the reve-







The employer in Figure 2 will set its employment level at B, because hiring any additional
workers will cost more than the additional revenue these workers will bring in, and hiring
fewer employees will waste an opportunity for profit. If the imposition of a minimum wage
or a comparable worth remedy raises the wage level to W*, the level of employment would
be expected to decline to B*.
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tional employee's individual wage rate ($12.15 per hour) plus the
cost of paying the extra fifteen cents to each of the other 24 work-
ers (a total of $3.60). Faced with the typical upward-sloping supply
curve for labor, the monopsonistic employer's marginal cost of la-
bor will always exceed the wage rate it has to pay to attract the
last employee it needs. This is shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
Employment
The employer will continue to hire workers until the marginal rev-
enue of the last employee (MRL) equals the marginal cost of that
employee (MCL); in Figure 3, employment will thus be set at E.
Moving up the labor supply curve, S, the employer must pay W to
attract E workers.
Now suppose a minimum wage law is passed or a comparable
worth remedy is imposed upon this monopsonistic employer. Sup-
pose the newly imposed "artificial" wage equals W* in Figure 3. At
that wage (W*), the firm will hire E* workers, because at any
higher level of employment the marginal cost of labor (i.e., the im-
posed wage rate W*) will exceed the marginal revenue of labor
(MRL), and at any lower level the marginal revenue of labor will
exceed the marginal cost. The effect of the imposition of the mini-
mum wage or the comparable worth remedy will thus be to raise
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the level of employment from E to E*. Under this model, maxi-
mum employment will be achieved by setting the wage to corre-
spond to the point at which the labor supply curve crosses the
marginal revenue of labor curve. From the original starting point
of W, wages can be raised as high as the point at which the margi-
nal cost of labor curve crosses the marginal revenue of labor curve
without causing any reduction in employment. 2
What this means for comparable worth is that if an employer
subjected to a comljarable worth remedy is a wage-setter or labor
monopsonist, the wage-enhancing remedy may not reduce, and
may even increase, employment. Moreover, if the industry contain-
ing the female-dominated occupation-for example, the hospital
industry for nurses, or the education industry for teachers-is gen-
erally monopsonistic, imposition of a comparable worth remedy in
that industry may actually increase employment of women. Al-
though there is evidence that some of the industries containing
female-dominated occupations may be wage-setters for those occu-
pations,13 it is not necessary to evaluate that evidence or reach any
firm conclusions in order to demonstrate that Fischel and Lazear
are mistaken when they assert that the imposition of a comparable
worth remedy will certainly reduce employment, and that the rem-
edy can therefore be dismissed without further consideration. 14
" Even under the monopsonistic model a reduction of employment will occur if wages
are raised above the point at which the marginal cost of labor curve crosses the marginal
revenue of labor curve. The larger the comparable worth remedy the more likely such a
result is to occur. But plainly we need to know a lot more about the particular market to
which the comparable worth remedy will be applied before we can determine whether the
remedy will reduce female emplo yment.
On the effect of imposing a minimum wage upon a monopsonistic labor market, see R.
FLANAGAN, R. SMITH & R. EHRENBERG, supra note 8, at 78-80; Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, The
Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE
487, 489 (1982); Maurice, Monopsony and the Effects of an Externally Imposed Minimum
Wage, 41 S. ECON. J. 283 (1974); Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36
AM. ECON. REV. 358, 360-361 (1946).
" See supra note 10.
14 In their rejoinder, Fischel and Lazear claim that "gains from imposing a minimum
wage in a monopsonistic industry exist only if there is underemployment," and that this is
inconsistent with the assumption that discrimination in other occupations causes an over-
supply of workers in female-dominated occupations. See Fischel & Lazear, Comparable
Worth: A Rejoinder, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 950, 951 (1986). This is incorrect. It is certainly true
that imposition of a minimum wage-or a comparable worth remedy-will increase a
monopsonistic firm's employment only if the firm's employment level is lower than it would
be in a competitive market. But the level of employment of such a monopsonistic firm has
little relation to whether the number of workers in the labor pool has been artificially in-
flated by discriminatory practices elsewhere.
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III. THE ULTIMATE IMPACT OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Even if we assume that comparable worth at first might cost
women some jobs in female-dominated occupations, and even if we
assume that the gain in women's wages will be insufficient to jus-
tify that job loss, our inquiry is not over as Fischel and Lazear
suggest. The arguments Fischel and Lazear make have been made
in the past against other social initiatives including child labor
laws, worker health and safety regulations, and the Equal Pay Act
itself. Proponents of those laws responded that any immediate dis-
advantage suffered by those the laws were designed to protect
would be outweighed by the longer-term benefits. 15 This may also
be the case with comparable worth.16
Like the minimum wage, especially in its early days, compara-
ble worth will directly affect only one part of the labor mar-
ket-the market in female-dominated occupations-and it will do
so only in a piecemeal, case-by-case manner. If comparable worth
is to be analogized to a minimum wage, it must be analogized to a
minimum wage with quite incomplete coverage. For the sake of
simplicity, I return to the assumption of a competitive labor mar-
ket. In such a market, if an effective minimum wage 7 is imposed
only on part of the market, it would be expected to reduce employ-
ment in that segment of the market. But the employees thrown out
of work in the covered segment of the market will seek employ-
ment in the segment not covered and will increase employment in
that segment by driving down wages. Figure 4 illustrates this
principle.
15 See, e.g., E. Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1896-1932, at 399 (J. Commons ed. 1935).
"8 In evaluating the ultimate impact of comparable worth, it is important to recognize
how the remedy is likely to operate. Few advocates of comparable worth expect federal leg-
islation which will immediately raise wages in all female-dominated occupations to the level
of wages in male-dominated occupations. Instead, comparable worth remedies would be im-
posed primarily on an employer-by-employer basis as the result of litigation or threatened
litigation. In addition, some states may pass laws imposing comparable worth remedies,
most likely upon public employers. The operation of the remedy is important not merely
because a painful remedy imposed gradually may seem less painful, but also because in this
case gradual imposition of the remedy may substantially affect its economic impact. In addi-
tion, in this area where so many of the theoretical predictions are uncertain, gradual imposi-
tion of the remedy will offer ample opportunity to study its actual effects.
17 By an effective minimum wage, I mean a minimum wage that is enforced and that is
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Suppose that the wage for unskilled labor in a competitive labor
market is set at W and that a higher minimum wage, W*, is estab-
lished for a subclass of unskilled labor-for example, unskilled
construction workers. The imposition of the minimum wage would
be expected to reduce employment of construction workers from E
to E* (again, assuming a competitive labor market), as shown in
Panel A. Panel B represents the market for unskilled labor not em-
ployed in the construction industry. The workers who lose their
jobs in the construction segment of the market will seek and secure
jobs in the nonconstruction segment, shifting the labor supply
curve from S1 to S2 , driving wages in that segment down from W
to W#, and raising employment in that segment of the market
from E to E#.
Imposing a comparable worth remedy on one segment of a
theoretically competitive labor market-that segment being com-
posed of female-dominated occupations-would have a similar ef-
fect on the rest of the labor market. Those workers who lose their
jobs in the segment of the market covered by the comparable wage
remedy would seek employment in the remainder of the market.
Employment would expand, thus lowering wages."8
"s This reduction in wages may at first seem troublesome, but when it is remembered
that the reduction will likely occur in a segment of the market in which wages have been
artificially inflated because of discrimination, the reduction should seem considerably less
troublesome.
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Fischel and Lazear note, quite correctly, that this mechanism
would not operate if those forced out of the first market are barred
from entry into the second market. But the labor market is not
neatly divided into just two segments: male-dominated and female-
dominated occupations. There are occupations open to both men
and women. Moreover, comparable worth advocates also seek to
continue and enhance present efforts to remove all barriers to the
entry of women into male-dominated occupations. In addition,
skilled and qualified women seeking employment in segments of
the labor market previously dominated by men will raise the price
of discrimination to employers and might cause some to stop dis-
criminating. Movement of women into the potential labor force
will increase the number of workers who will take employment at
each wage level. The incentive of the industry to stop discriminat-
ing (i.e., the money it can save by agreeing to open up its labor
force to women) thus increases, and the likelihood that the indus-
try's "taste" for discrimination will be sufficient to persuade it to
ignore the potential savings decreases.
To refine the incomplete minimum wage analogy a bit further,
comparable worth is likely to be applied on an employer-by-
employer basis. Again assuming a competitive market, an increase
in wages paid by one employer may cause a reduction of employ-
ment by that employer. The employees laid off or not hired by that
employer would then compete for other jobs, thus reducing the
wages of those other jobs. As more and more comparable worth
remedies are applied, the artificially inflated wages in male-domi-
nated occupations would be expected to fall as more and more
women seek those jobs, while at the same time wages would rise in
the female-dominated occupations. Comparable worth would thus
tend to restore the proper allocation of labor and other resources
by correcting both the artificial depression of wages in female-
dominated occupations and the artificial inflation of wages in
male-dominated occupations.
However ambiguous the initial effect of comparable worth
might be, the long-term effect is even more difficult to assess with-
out further research, and thus even more difficult to dismiss as in-
advisable.19 The advocates of comparable worth strive to put an
end to sex discrimination in employment. If all the remedy accom-
plishes is to raise the wages of some women in some female-
19 See Hartmann, Roos & Treiman, An Agenda for Basic Research on Comparable




dominated occupations, comparable worth will not have achieved
its ultimate objective. But equality in the workplace can be real-
ized only by breaking down sex segregation in employment and it
seems likely that, over the long term, comparable worth will have
that result.
Sex segregation is a two-way street. Occupations are female-
dominated not only because other occupations are closed to women
(by actions of employers or male employees or through the effect
of cultural stereotypes), but also because men do not want the
female-dominated jobs, or at least do not want them at the de-
pressed, female-dominated wage. Raising wages in female-
dominated occupations will cause more men to seek those jobs,
men who would otherwise have gone into male-dominated jobs.20
But that is not all; the movement of men into female-dominated
jobs can be expected to make room for women in the previously
male-dominated jobs, further breaking down sex segregation.2'
Thus, the second-order and third-order effects of comparable
worth may be quite beneficial. Previously female-dominated occu-
pations will attract more men as a result of increased wage levels.
Traditionally male-dominated occupations-no longer enjoying the
recruiting advantage of comparatively high wages-will lose poten-
tial male workers to the previously female-dominated occupations.
Employers in these male-dominated fields will either have to bid
higher to recruit males or open up their work forces to women.
Women who might otherwise have accepted low-paying jobs in
female-dominated occupations will be forced to compete with men
for those jobs at the new, higher wages. At the same time, women
will seek the jobs vacated (or not taken) by men in the male-
dominated occupations.22 The result may well be a gradual break-
20 Because employment in the female-dominated occupations may be reduced (depend-
ing on whether the market for those jobs is competitive or monopsonistic), the effect may
not be immediate, but it can certainly be argued that raising wages will eventually cause
some breakdown of sex segregation as men, attracted by higher wages, enter previously fe-
male-dominated occupations.
21 See MICHAEL GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 56-57 (1983); Bergmann,
The Economic Case for Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH: NEw DIRECTIONS FOR
RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 82-83; see also American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,
719-20 (7th Cir. 1986) (in describing the economic arguments against comparable worth,
Judge Posner notes that "the change in relative wages will send men in the same direction
[as women]: fewer men will enter the traditionally men's jobs, more the traditionally
women's jobs. As a result there will be more room for women in traditionally men's jobs and
at the same time fewer opportunities for women in traditionally women's jobs.").
" The imposition of comparable worth remedies may also cause the breakdown of arti-
ficial, sex-based distinctions between jobs. Employers often claim that wage differentials are
justified by relatively slight differences in job duties. These differences may be mere pretext,
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down of sex segregation in employment. I do not argue that com-
parable worth will inevitably cause a breakdown of sex segregation,
but I do argue that it is impossible to dismiss comparable
worth-as Fischel and Lazear do-without at least considering this
long-term and beneficial possibility.
CONCLUSION
Fischel and Lazear claim to demonstrate that comparable
worth would be a bad idea-even from the standpoint of
women-under all conceivable circumstances. To test their conclu-
sion as well as to summarize my arguments, it may be useful to
hypothesize a plausible state of affairs to which a comparable
worth remedy might be applied. The female-dominated occupation
of nursing serves as a useful example. Suppose that the employers
of nurses deal in a monopsonistic rather than a competitive labor
market.23 Suppose further that the market for men of similar skills
and training (for the sake of simplicity, I will call such men engi-
neers) is competitive.24 Because of discrimination, which acts as an
entry barrier to women, the wages of engineers are substantially
higher than those of nurses. Now suppose that a comparable worth
remedy is applied to the nursing occupation, and nurses' wages are
elevated to the same level as those of engineers. Employment of
nurses expands because of the monopsonistic nature of the nursing
field. 5 Some men who would really have preferred nursing all
along, but did not want to accept the lower wages, move away from
engineering to nursing as nursing careers become financially more
attractive. The "desertion" of engineering by some men going into
nursing creates vacancies in engineering. Women, noticing these
vacancies and facing stiffer competition for high-wage nursing jobs,
begin to disregard stereotypes, incur the cost of fighting discrimi-
nation, and pursue their preferred career-engineering. Sex segre-
gation is broken down, albeit gradually, wages and employment are
increased for women in female-dominated occupations, jobs in pre-
or imposed with the intention of justifying otherwise unjustified wage disparities, or based
on sex stereotypes. Once comparable worth destroys the wage disparities and sex segrega-
tion begins to break down, employers may be expected to eliminate unnecessary distinctions
between jobs.
23 This supposition is not without support. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24 ROBERT BUNTING, EMPLOYER CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS (1962).
' This assumes that the level of wages after the imposition of the comparable worth
remedy is set at a point below that at which the marginal cost of labor curve for this monop-




viously male-dominated occupations are opened to women, and
both the level of employment and the wage level are brought closer
to their "natural" competitive levels.
My purpose has not been to prove an economic case for com-
parable worth; I leave that to others.26 What I think I have shown
is that the economic case against comparable worth is hardly as
simple and clear-cut as Fischel and Lazear suppose. As supporters
of comparable worth acknowledge, research into the nature of the
labor market-particularly insofar as it involves female-dominated
occupations-is needed before the economic effects of comparable
worth can be assessed.
14 See Bergmann, supra note 21, at 82-83; Bergmann & Gray, Economic Models as a
Means of Calculating Legal Compensation Claims, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE Dis-
CRIMINATION 155 (H. Remick ed. 1984); Grune, Pay Equity Is a Necessary Remedy for Wage
Discrimination, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 3, at 165; Marshall & Paulin, The Em-
ployment and Earnings of Women: The Comparable Worth Debate, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's,
supra note 3, at 196.
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